Ever since Israel gained its independence, the country’s strategists have warned against multifront wars and, worse, ones that drag on for a long time. The need for decisive and short military campaigns derives from the military’s reliance mainly on reservists and volunteers, hence for economic and social reasons it does not have the “luxury” of engaging in a prolonged war, especially for a small nation.

The Israel Defense Forces — a “people’s army” of conscripts and reservists — also requires a high level of consensus regarding the objectives of a war and the means employed, something that the current Israeli government hardly enjoys among its people. 

Moreover, being territorially small and having little strategic depth, where population centers and strategic assets are close to its borders, is also a source of vulnerability that creates a certain security mindset.
Israel has now been embroiled in a multifront war, with some fronts more active than others, for more than 18 months, while the conflict with the Houthis, and by extension Iran, is heating up again, and there is tense anticipation of a full-scale assault on Gaza that will have horrific consequences. 

However, the front with Syria stands out. Unlike Gaza, Lebanon, or even Yemen, there was no initial act of aggression by Damascus before Israel took a unilateral step to take swaths of Syrian land beyond that part of the Golan Heights already occupied since 1967, in addition to its use of excessive military force following last December’s revolution which toppled the regime of Syria’s dictator Bashar Assad.

Since the 2011 uprising in Syria and the ensuing deadly conflict there, Israel has operated quite freely in Syria, mainly attacking convoys of weapons and ammunition from Iran on their way to Hezbollah in Lebanon and their depots in Syria, and targeting Hezbollah and Iranian military personnel who were propping up the Assad regime until its downfall. Ostensibly the end of the previous regime in Syria should have been a source of relief for Israel, especially as it came hard on the heels of Israel’s actions that substantially reduced the military capabilities of Hezbollah in Lebanon and decimated its leadership in the autumn of last year, and the end of the Tehran-friendly regime in Damascus. 

After all, for years Israel had been concerned over the continuing presence of Iran and its proxies close to its borders. This is no longer the case now that Hamas and Hezbollah’s military capabilities have been so badly hit, and with the change of leadership in Damascus the weapons-supply lifeline to Hezbollah in Lebanon has been cut, creating a buffer zone between Israel and its number one regional enemy.

However, the change of leadership in Syria brought to power Ahmad Al-Sharaa. This is a source of concern for Israel, which took the decision to use military power to capture land from the new government, not as retaliation for any hostile act but as a “down payment” to deter a leadership that might or might not be hostile. 

Thus far there has been no suggestion that Syria is abrogating the 1974 disengagement agreement that kept this border quiet. However, it was Israel that was first to violate the armistice agreement by immediately taking control of more than 400 sq. km of land that according to the post-1973 war agreement was a demilitarized buffer zone deep inside Syrian territory. 

Initially, the Israeli government claimed that this was a temporary measure, although any observer of Israel’s past behavior in these circumstances knows that the notion “temporary” is relative and can mean any length of time. Not only has the Israeli military set up watchtowers there, along with prefabricated housing modules, roads, and communication infrastructure — in other words military outposts — but Israel’s defense minister has said that the Israeli forces are “prepared to stay in Syria for an unlimited amount of time” to ensure Israel’s security.

Israel, like many others in the region, has legitimate concerns about what kind of country Syria will become after Assad, considering that the main armed group to lead the revolution has emerged from the remnants of Jabhat Al-Nusra, Al-Qaeda’s former Syrian branch. Unfortunately the Israel of post-Oct. 7 has only one modus operandi, and it is the use of excessive military force, which antagonizes even those countries that do not necessarily harbor ill intentions toward it.