Many perceive history as a slow-moving process marked by gradual developments and incremental change. However, it is often punctuated by abrupt paradigm shifts that unexpectedly reshape entire regions. 

The Middle East, a region long characterized by instability and conflict, has entered a new phase following the ceasefire in Lebanon in late November and the fall of the Assad regime at the beginning of December. These events mark the onset of a potentially transformative period.

This shift is particularly evident in the evolving dynamics between the Gulf Cooperation Council states and the conflict-ridden nations of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. A notable example is the breakthrough last month that saw Saudi Arabia sponsor an agreement between Lebanon and Syria on border demarcation and enhanced cooperation on security. These developments signal renewed engagement and the potential for regional cooperation. Yet, the crucial question remains: what should be the next steps?

Over recent years, state-to-state relations within the Middle East have significantly improved, as characterized by a notable diffusion of tensions and a growing commitment to reconciliation, particularly between Iran and other regional states, highlighted by the 2023 Beijing agreement between Tehran and Saudi Arabia. The perceived reduction in American engagement in the region created both challenges and opportunities, prompting detente between the GCC states, Iran and Iraq.

However, as states reengaged diplomatically, Iran found space to maneuver through its so-called axis of resistance network, including Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iraqi militias. This strategic recalibration allowed Iran to reduce state-level tensions while expanding its influence through nonstate actors.

These subtle shifts culminated in a seismic event: the Oct. 7 attacks, which dramatically altered regional calculations. However, Iran’s axis of resistance failed to achieve its intended objectives. It did not deter Israel, serve effectively as the first line of defense for the Iranian regime or significantly influence American policy in the region. Despite these setbacks — or perhaps because of them — Iran remained committed to maintaining stable, state-level relationships with the GCC, Egypt and other regional actors, even as its proxies continued to employ resistance rhetoric and carry out military attacks.

This delicate balancing act was particularly visible in Lebanon, where Israel’s offensive undermined Hezbollah’s credibility as a resistance force. Over recent decades, Hezbollah’s role has undergone a profound transformation. Initially a guerrilla group conducting asymmetric warfare, Hezbollah increasingly assumed the characteristics of a conventional, hierarchical military organization, especially following its perceived successes in 2006. This transition fundamentally altered its strategic position and, most importantly, exposed its vulnerabilities. Its evolution from a resistance force to a semi-conventional army diminished its tactical advantages, rendering it more predictable and vulnerable.

For lasting regional stability, the demilitarization of militias and strengthening of state institutions is essential. For Lebanon and Syria to rebuild and thrive, prioritizing state-building over militarized resistance is crucial. Such a shift demands a new narrative away from the decades-old dominance of resistance discourse.

Lebanon and Syria represent critical testing grounds for this approach. Currently, two competing narratives shape their future trajectories. Despite arriving at this juncture from distinct starting points, both nations share fundamental similarities, standing at a crossroads with mutually exclusive paths forward.

The first narrative maintains that military resistance remains the most effective approach to national and regional challenges, guaranteeing deterrence. Popular in Lebanon after the 2006 war, this view contributed to Syria’s prolonged civil war. The alternative narrative, championed by segments of the new Lebanese and Syrian governments and civil society activists, prioritizes diplomacy and state-to-state engagement over armed conflict. This diplomatic approach was clearly articulated in the ministerial statement of the Lebanese government.

Recent developments suggest that the second narrative is gaining traction. The US has actively facilitated diplomatic engagements, starting with the successful maritime border demarcation between Israel and Lebanon in 2022. The Lebanese government’s increasing emphasis on diplomatic channels to address the withdrawal of Israeli forces from remaining positions in the south of the country and its readiness for border demarcation negotiations mark a potential turning point in Beirut’s approach to regional affairs. Similarly, the new Syrian government appears committed to embracing diplomatic solutions.