*By: Fernando Carvajal Paris,AIJES : As Joe Biden is declared US president-elect, expectations vary from among the pessimists on the Left and experts in the Middle East to optimism over lessons learned. In the US, the Left has already sent the first warnings on expectations, focused on foreign policy and singling out the relationship with Saudi Arabia and the war in Yemen. The coalition that brought victory for the Democratic party included major Progressive members of Congress, a segment that opposes US support for the Saudi Arabia-led Coalition, among other priorities. Yemeni-Americans have also raised expectations for the Biden administration, as part of the coalition winning Michigan. Mounting pressure at home will undoubtedly drive a number of opportunities to advance efforts to de-escalate the conflict and restart peace talks in Yemen soon after Inauguration Day 2021.    The current administration’s hands-off approach in the Middle East has exonerated Arab regimes both at home and in the region. As reality sinks in on a Biden administration, concern grows among both, Trump’s friends and Progressives over potential for a Biden pivot toward more intrusive Obama-era policies and limited access to weapons purchases. Biden would shift from Trump’s administration content with the reciprocal relationship maintained with Gulf monarchies, based on access to weapons in exchange for mutually beneficial public gestures of cooperation, while balancing tensions within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Observes highlight the pressure from some in Biden’s own camp demanding significant departure from Trump’s approach to relationships with Arab regimes, in particular. Critics of the current administration underline the manner in which Trump’s hands-off approach, and business interests, served to prolong the war in Yemen and turned a blind eye to possible international humanitarian law (IHL) violations. Focus remains on the personal relationship between Trump’s family members and Arab officials, marginalizing the work by US diplomats and Defense officials. This approach will definitely not continue under a Biden administration, raising concern among Arab leaders over access to the president and control over their own institutions. While observers acknowledge these concerns they highlight the persistent reliance on US cooperation amid growing economic and security vulnerabilities in the region. Iran remains a top priority for both sides following end to UN sanctions.      While Biden’s potentially unique approach, a more pragmatic agenda than during Obama’s second term, will rattle relations with Gulf monarchies, his pivot could lead to substantial progress on Yemen’s peace process. There are three main reasons under a Biden presidency that could contribute to such positive expectations. One, progressive members of Congress such as Sen. Bernie Sanders (Vt), Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn) and Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Ca) and even Republican Mike Lee (Utah) are expected to pressure a Biden Administration on weapon sales and on criticism of Saudi Arabia. This group will undoubtedly be joined by the Squad, Democratic House members Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (NY), Ilham Omar (Mn), Ayanna Pressley (Mass) and Rashida Tlaib (Mi), staunch critics of Gulf regimes. Second, Biden will most likely prioritize a return to talks with Iran to rescue the Nuclear Deal abandoned by Trump. Saudi Arabia, and Israel, will again aim at influencing a Biden administration to limit concessions made to Tehran. Third, a Biden administration would prioritize re-engagement with the European Union and the NATO alliance, addressing, among many other issues, relations with Turkey, the situation in Iraq and Syria at a highly volatile time and amid a growing threat from ISIS-inspired terrorist attacks in Western Europe. These issues cannot ignore the role of Iran in the region as the one-year anniversary of the assassination of Gen. Qasem Suleimani approaches. Biden Under Pressure at Home A victory by Joe Biden signaled an astounding rejection of Donald J. Trump, delivered by a wide-ranging coalition of democrats, progressives and moderate Republicans. Among those behind gathering such a coalition are Sen. Bernie Sanders, Sen. Elizabeth Warren and Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, all holding significant leverage over a Biden Administration. This pressure is not confined to domestic issues, foreign policy also featured high on priorities for Sanders  and Warren during their own presidential campaigns. Relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, embroiled in the conflict with Qatar and the war in Yemen, will definitely face mounting challenges. Biden is not just seen as a rejection of the Trump approach to the region, but also as an extension of the Obama legacy. When Biden was Vice President, he witnessed the change of the guard in Saudi Arabia from the late King Abdullah to Salman bin Abd al-Aziz, and now Biden himself will find a much different Saudi Arabia, nearly five years now under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The Crown Prince now holds the defense portfolio, with his brother Khaled as his deputy and in charge of the Yemen file. Both, the Crown Prince and Prince Khaled have visited the White House and maintained direct communications with Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner. The personal relationships that granted Saudi Arabia reprieve following the Kashoggi incident and the mounting accusations of war crimes in Yemen will not exist in a Biden Administration. It is important to keep in mind that the Powers Acts is among issues carrying over from the Trump era. The most recent fight in Congress aimed at limiting Trump’s ability to go to war with Iran, but we must recall that Senator Sanders was among a number of members of Congress that criticized president Obama, and Vice President Biden, for US support of Saudi Arabia and the UAE at the start of the war in Yemen in March 2015. President Biden would have two options under the emerging political environment, either negotiate a deal with progressives in the Democratic Party pledging to not go soft on Saudi Arabia and halt weapon sales or face an embarrassing scenario where members of his own party, joined by Republicans looking to obstruct Biden as much as possible, move to limit his powers and publicly undermine his foreign policy options. As opposed to Trump’s relationship with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which emboldened their roles in Libya and Yemen, a Biden presidency under pressure from the Left would undercut leverage of Gulf monarchies vis-à-vis actors on the ground in Yemen, for example. In response to increasing unpredictability in recent months, Saudi Arabia and the internationally recognized government of Yemen resisted pressure to announce a new cabinet following the agreement in August between president Hadi and the pro-secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) until after the US presidential election. Saudi Arabia and president Hadi hedged their bets on a second term for Trump, which would grant both leverage over the STC and advance a more favorable composition of the Cabinet. It is still likely that a new Cabinet is formed before the end of 2020, as the STC know their relationship with the UAE could also change under a US administration that is more engaged and looking to de-escalate the conflict upon taking office. Iran has not sat idle on the sidelines either and has perhaps positioned itself far better than its regional rivals. The arrival of a new ambassador to Sana’a in mid-October signaled a major escalation in diplomatic relations. Ambassador Hassan Eyrlou, reportedly “an IRGC member tied to Lebanese Hizballah” was smuggled into Sana’a from Oman during the latest prisoner exchange between Houthis and the government of Yemen, including two US nationals. This move aggravated relations between Saudi Arabia and the Office of the UN Special Envoy to Yemen as Yemeni officials accused the current UN Envoy Martin Griffiths of complicity in the violation of the embargo.  Iran has grown bolder in publicly acknowledging its relations with Houthis since signing of a defense cooperation agreement December 2019 in Tehran. Not a Straight Path Iran has positioned itself, within the Arabian Peninsula, in a manner in which it can exploit substantial leverage on a Biden pivot away from current US approach in the region. The regime in Tehran, more so than Houthis in Sana’a, has managed to prove to the international community that it can operate around Saudi and Emirati defense posture and expand its political and military spheres to advance its interests. Whether it is a military confrontation under Trump or a diplomatic test under Biden, Iran has secured enough leverage to negotiate under favorable terms. Yemeni observers agree that ambassador Eyrlou was not the only one smuggled from Muscat. The tactic used is fairly well known, as a number of Iranian officials and Houthi elements travel to and from Sana’a by air, bypassing the long road from Sana’a to Mareb, Sayyun and the Mahra-Oman border. While no one is yet suggesting flights serve to smuggle weapons, drones or missiles, observers don’t doubt smaller components such as batteries, computer chips or radar components are transported to Sana’a. The trend in both smuggling and attacks by Houthis on Saudi territory has involved the use of smaller drones, along with deployment of short-range ballistic missiles and weaponized over-the-counter drones on positions held by the Yemeni Army and Coalition troops along various battle fronts. This complicates the circumstances for a possible Biden administration, as well as the position held by progressives in Congress aiming to halt weapon sales to Gulf allies. The military threat posed by Iran, and now Houthis, has long been used by Israel and Saudi Arabia to justify a role in the war in Yemen and procurement of weapons systems, both defensive and offensive. In order for Biden to rally support from Gulf allies for re-engagement on the Iran Nuclear Deal, the Democrat must reassure allies of pressure on Iran to de-escalate and rein in the Houthis in Sana’a. Both demands will come at a very high price. Tehran will insist on the UN expanding the table and include the Iranian regime as a power broker in peace negotiations under Griffiths. The aim is not just to act as a counterweight in negotiations but ensure a role in organizing a final solution to the conflict in Yemen that advances its interests and maintains Houthis within its sphere of influence. This is problematic for Crown Prince Mohammed who aims to recreate Saudi influence in Yemen as his uncles once did since the end of the revolution in North Yemen in 1967. It is worth noting that Saudi Arabia provided monthly stipends to Yemeni officials, including members of the Al Houthi family, for decades until the start of the Youth Uprising in 2011. Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi (d. 2004) was a member of Parliament, helped the Saleh regime fight secessionists in 1994 and was involved in the settlement of the Saudi-Yemeni border agreement of 2000, all the while receiving financial stipends from Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, while Houthis greatly benefit from the international recognition granted by Iran, they don’t necessarily see eye to eye on Iran’s role beyond providing military assistance. Houthis continue to insist on their sovereignty and reject claims by Saudi Arabia and other rivals that they are puppets of Tehran, while a number of Iranian officials have publicly announced that “Sana’a is the fourth Arab capital in [their] hands”. In order for Houthis to accept any deal on a ceasefire they will insist on direct talks with Saudi Arabia prior to start of any comprehensive peace talks with President Hadi and the STC. This is not only a problem for Iran but mainly a non-starter for President Hadi and his government. Both Iran and Hadi fear a secret deal between Saudi Arabia and Houthis will undermine their long-term interests in Yemen, primarily Hadi fears being removed as president as part of the agreement. It would be difficult to convince Iran to abandon Sana’a as part of the process to re-engage the Nuclear Deal, but it is not impossible. In partnership with European allies, who hold deep economic interests in advancing relations with Iran, the Biden administration could ideally negotiate an Iranian exit from Sana’a, knowing the regime will maintain low level presence. Unilateral sanctions against Iranian entities remains an option for the US, and under a more pragmatic Biden administration, European allies would be less reluctant to join in order to exert further pressure on Iran to comply. Biden would hold on to Trump era sanctions as a carrot, which also serve to assure both Israel and Saudi Arabia that Biden is not willing to let Iran off the hook easily. Other options The war in Yemen is now near its seventh year, and Houthis continue to hold the upper hand on the ground. Yet, even with gains against the coalition and Yemen’s National Army, Houthis also recognize there is no final solution through military victory. Houthis are suffering economically and know the limited support they receive can always be bargained away for greater interests. The economics of the war have also had a great impact on the UAE, forcing it to withdraw its troops from southern Yemen and the West Coast in 2019  primarily as result of budget constraints, which have also affected relations with the STC and its affiliated security forces. Saudi Arabia has also felt the pinch from financial support for president Hadi’s government, financing the war against the Houthis and weapons purchases from the US to strengthen its defense throughout the Kingdom, all at a time of economic uncertainty. There is no doubt the Biden administration will be pressured to end support for the war on Yemen on day one. Its options are limited and come at high political risk at home and in the region. European allies, who have proven limited in their influence since the signing of the Stockholm plan December 2018, also want to see progress on the peace track. Ultimately, there is also no doubt that if any of these efforts are to succeed, Yemenis must bear the bulk of the responsibility to secure progress and deter potential spoilers along the way. There is no way Biden can secure progress through diplomacy alone if the parties on the ground do more to protect their individual interests than advancing peace and relief to millions of impoverished Yemenis facing famine and infectious decease outbreaks throughout the country. While a number of Yemeni actors have reached out to Russia, it is unlikely president Putin is willing to play a major role in the Yemeni conflict. Russia is expected to continue playing a role at the UN Security Council, where the UK is the penholder on Yemen, primarily blocking expansion of mandates or a new round of sanctions on individuals. On the UN track, Martin Griffiths is the third UN envoy to Yemen and is on his third year in the post, he’s come under increasing criticism by all parties, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Under such conditions, a Biden Administration could see an opportunity to reintroduce a plan drafted by former Secretary of State John Kerry in 2016, which could marginalize the UN in the process. Griffiths is close to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, and both would fight to maintain the UN as the host of any peace talks, but it is unlikely the US would expend much political capital to hand over the process to the UN. It is difficult to predict if the UN can maintain its high-profile role in Yemen or if it is time to introduce a new neutral broker that can better balance relations between actors to re-start comprehensive dialogue toward a peace agreement.   *Fernando Carvajal served on the UNSC Panel of Experts on Yemen from 2017 to 2019. He has spent nearly twenty years visiting/living in Yemen conducting research on history of state-building, the Zaydi Imamate, tribes and democratization and security affairs in the Arabian Peninsula. He has also worked as a consultant in Sana’a for various government institutions and civil society organizations.