After the sudden collapse of Bashar Assad’s dictatorship, many people have understandably urged foreign powers not to meddle in Syria’s affairs. “Syria’s future must be determined by Syrians, not outside powers,” wrote the Hagop Kevorkian Center’s Mohamad Bazzi for The Guardian, while International Crisis Group declared that outside powers “need to avoid destabilizing interference.” These sentiments are laudable.

Ever since protests erupted against Assad in 2011, outsiders have sought to bend the ensuing civil war in a favorable direction. And Syria would almost certainly benefit from the same forces leaving the country alone as it transitions away from Baathist rule. However, while Syrians should be the ones who determine the shape of their country, it is unrealistic to expect outside powers to suddenly cease their interference. Foreign involvement is a reality Syria’s new government must deal with and manage as best it can.

Syria’s strategic location has long meant it attracted outside meddling. In the 1950s, rivals Egypt and Iraq backed different factions, as did Britain, the US and USSR. This pattern resurfaced after 2011, when Russia and Iran supported Assad in the civil war while Turkiye, Qatar and others backed the rebels. The US sponsored a selection of rebel groups but mostly the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces to fight Daesh. Meanwhile, Israel, though not backing a faction, took advantage of the chaos to launch airstrikes on Iran-linked targets. Nor was it only state governments involved, nonstate actors like Daesh and the PKK weighed in to further their interests.

As a result, Syrians hoping to rebuild after Assad face a devastated, war-torn state. But they also face a country that has been deeply penetrated by outside interests. Some foreign actors are willing to act with little or no regard for Damascus. Already in the week since Assad’s fall, Turkiye, Israel and the US have launched military operations on Syrian territory. Turkiye has continued its attacks on the SDF, which it regards as a terrorist entity, Israel has occupied more land surrounding the occupied Golan Heights and destroyed Syrian military assets fearing they will fall into hostile hands, while the US has hit Daesh in the east.

But alongside a willingness to use their own forces unilaterally, the years of civil war have seen multiple outsiders develop new networks across Syrian society. Some are overt, such as the Syrian National Army, which is sponsored by Turkiye, and the SDF, with its links to the US. Others are more covert or not currently active. Iran and Russia, for example, will still have ties with some former Assad loyalists, after years of collaboration. The Gulf states likewise built relationships with various oppositionists early in the war that might be reactivated in the future. Daesh, similarly, retains cells across Syria. As well as having the military tools to directly infringe on Syrian sovereignty, these networks and relationships give outsiders further opportunities to interfere.

It seems unlikely that the outside actors that have meddled for years will suddenly discover a benevolent side, check their involvement and put Syrians’ long-term interests over their short-term needs. Instead, it will more likely fall on Syria’s new rulers to carefully navigate a perilous geopolitical situation to ensure that foreign interference remains peripheral and does not undermine transition efforts. While there are numerous things Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham and the new government can do to mitigate the risks, two stand out.