By / Dr Syed Kaleem Imam

A decade ago, the world braced for headline-grabbing attacks on airplanes, embassies, and business hubs. Today, militancy hides in plain sight. A WhatsApp group in Lahore, an AI-generated video in Mali, or a lone attacker in Paris can carry the same destabilizing weight as a bomb in Baghdad once did. The threat has not vanished; it has mutated.

To see where we are headed, it helps to recall where we have been. Modern ‘terrorism’ has moved through four eras: nationalist insurgencies like the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); Al-Qaeda militancy that climaxed with 9/11 and the “War on Terror”; Daesh’s territorial “caliphate” that drew 40,000 foreign fighters; and today’s fragmented world of lone actors, drones, and hybrid crime–terror networks.

The Global Terrorism Index 2025 makes the transformation plain. Militancy-related deaths dropped 13 percent in 2024 compared to the brutal peaks of the 2010s, but instability has only deepened. 98 percent of fatalities now occur in conflict zones, as the number of wars rose from 69 to 91 in just a year. Attacks spread to 66 countries in 2024, up from 58 the year before.

Four groups still account for 80 percent of militancy-related deaths worldwide. But the harder fight is against lone wolves radicalized online, whose attacks in the West rose from 32 in 2023 to 52 last year. Most alarming of all, one in five related suspects in Europe is now under 18.

Three shifts define 2025. First, decentralization: extremism is no longer the monopoly of Al-Qaeda or Daesh but sprouts locally, insurgents in Pakistan and Myanmar devastating border communities, Daesh remnants in Iraq and Syria slipping back into guerrilla ambushes. In Gaza, a grinding war has created fertile ground for splinter groups, a reminder that unresolved conflicts breed the next wave.

Second, technology: encrypted apps shield recruiters while doctored videos and viral clips spread propaganda faster than any checkpoint can stop. Off-the-shelf drones and cheap editing tools now make militants global broadcasters of fear.

Third, geography: the bloodiest toll has shifted to South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, with Burkina Faso surpassing Afghanistan as a hotspot. In Yemen, stalled peace talks leave spaces for Al-Qaeda to regroup; in Syria, the Al-Hol camp still housing thousands of Daesh-linked families is a ticking time bomb.

Pakistan shows the uneasy transition: large-scale bombings in cities have eased, but border insurgencies and online radicalization are steadily on the rise. Militants have shifted strategies, insurgencies along the Afghan border and digital radicalization among disaffected youth are on the rise. A single viral video from militants in Waziristan today can perhaps sow more fear than a roadside bomb did 10 years ago.

Dangerous myths endure. One claims that once an area is “stabilized,” it will not relapse. In reality, violence often returns if grievances are left to fester. Nigeria’s and Pakistan’s towns relapse after the military sweeps. In Iraq, Daesh’s fall was followed by a fresh insurgency-- proof that brute force alone cannot end terrorism. Ideology mutates, networks regroup, and repression often deepens the cycle.

The more dangerous illusion is to see terror as an import from outside. In reality, it often takes root at home, fed by injustice and neglect. Egypt’s Sinai is a case in point: foreign backing plays a role, but it is local grievances that keep the insurgency alive. Blaming an “outside hand” is convenient; it also blinds policymakers to the rot inside.

So, what is the way forward? Think of it less as a war to be won and more as a chronic condition to be managed. Resilient institutions, digital literacy that inoculates citizens against manipulation, and strong local governance that offers people dignity and trust are all essential. The lesson is clear: guns and laws cannot win alone; the real battle is over stories and belonging. Extremists trade in certainty and identity; governments must counter with clarity, opportunity, and hope.

Jordan’s investment in civic education to pre-empt youth radicalization, though modest, is one example of states beginning to adapt. In Peshawar, small digital-literacy workshops teach students how to spot disinformation before it spreads. In Kenya, community policing is rebuilding trust. Saudi Arabia’s Sakina and Munasaha programs, and the UAE’s Hedayah center, show proactive approaches. In Iraq, art and dialogue help reintegrate returnees from Daesh-held areas, proof that mending the social fabric is as vital as securing borders.